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ClickFix Malware Variant Delivers ModeloRAT

ClickFix Malware Variant Delivers ModeloRAT via CrashFix Technique

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Cybersecurity researchers have identified a new wave of ClickFix attacks, a social engineering technique increasingly exploited by both cybercriminals and state-sponsored groups. Microsoft recently warned that attackers are now leveraging a CrashFix variant of ClickFix to distribute ModeloRAT, a remote access trojan (RAT) targeting enterprise environments.

 

How ClickFix Works

The ClickFix attack chain relies on deception rather than traditional exploits:

  • Attackers display a fake error message on compromised or malicious websites.
  • Victims are instructed to press specific keys or run commands to “fix” the issue.
  • By following these steps, users unknowingly grant elevated permissions, execute attacker-supplied scripts, or download malware.

Technical Breakdown of the CrashFix Variant

Microsoft observed a recent campaign where attackers instructed victims to run a cmd.exe command that:

  1. Performs a DNS lookup against a hard-coded external DNS server (instead of the system’s default resolver).
  2. Filters the output to extract the “Name:” field from the DNS response.
  3. Executes this extracted value as the second-stage payload.

This DNS-based tactic allows attackers to:

  • Blend malicious traffic into normal network activity.
  • Validate execution before delivering the next stage.
  • Evade detection by traditional security tools.

Payload Delivery

  • Stage 1: DNS lookup command execution.
  • Stage 2: Malicious Python script for reconnaissance.
  • Stage 3: Deployment of ModeloRAT, which enables:
    • System information collection
    • Execution of additional payloads
    • Persistence mechanisms for long-term access

Huntress Findings: KongTuke Campaign

Security firm Huntress linked the CrashFix variant to a threat actor known as KongTuke. Their campaign involved:

  • A malicious browser extension named NexShield, impersonating uBlock Origin Lite.
  • Fake pop-ups claiming the browser had “stopped abnormally.”
  • Delivery of ModeloRAT as the final payload.

The campaign specifically targeted corporate environments, highlighting the attacker’s focus on enterprise compromise.

Why This Matters

  • User deception bypasses traditional defenses: No exploit is needed; attackers rely on tricking users.
  • Persistence and control: ModeloRAT ensures long-term access to compromised systems.
  • Detection evasion: DNS-based payload delivery blends into legitimate traffic.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

 

Record type Info Value
NS TTL 21600 otto.ns.cloudflare.com
NS TTL 21600 ursula.ns.cloudflare.com
NS TTL 1800 otto.ns.cloudflare.com
Domain nexsnield.com
Domain www.matbao.net
Domain nexsnield.com
Domain www.nexsnield.com
a3a06422e0a35c7722fce88343f32a6d
Hash MD5 fbfce492d1aa458c0ccc8ce4611f0e2d00913c8d51b5016ce60a7f59db67de67
Hash SHA-256 fbfce492d1aa458c0ccc8ce4611f0e2d00913c8d51b5016ce60a7f59db67de67
IP Address v4 216.150.1.1 ||  170.168.103.0 – 170.168.103.255 || 144.31.221[.]197

 

Defensive Detection Matrix (ClickFix / CrashFix / ModeloRAT)

MITRE ATT&CK Technique Detection Focus Recommended Logging / Rules
T1189 – Drive-by Compromise Malicious websites serving fake error messages Web proxy logs, DNS filtering, URL reputation checks. Detect abnormal redirects or domains flagged as suspicious.
T1204.004 – User Execution: Malicious Copy/Paste Users running attacker-supplied commands Endpoint monitoring for unusual clipboard activity, PowerShell/Command Prompt execution logs. Alert on commands copied from browsers.
T1059.003 – Command Interpreter (cmd.exe) DNS lookup via hard-coded external resolver Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation). Detect nslookup or cmd.exe with external DNS server arguments.
T1071.004 – Application Layer Protocol: DNS DNS used for payload delivery DNS query logs. Flag queries to uncommon external resolvers or domains with suspicious response patterns.
T1027 – Obfuscated Payloads DNS response parsed into executable payload Monitor for scripts parsing DNS output. Detect unusual string extraction from DNS responses.
T1082 – System Information Discovery ModeloRAT reconnaissance EDR telemetry. Detect scripts querying system info (hostname, OS version, hardware).
T1046 – Network Service Scanning Python script scanning network Network IDS/IPS. Alert on Python processes generating high-volume outbound traffic.
T1547 – Persistence via Autostart ModeloRAT persistence Registry monitoring (Run keys), scheduled tasks, startup folder changes.
T1219 – Remote Access Trojan (ModeloRAT) RAT activity Detect anomalous outbound connections, persistence artifacts, and RAT-specific signatures.
T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Data sent via RAT Monitor for unusual outbound traffic volume, encrypted channels to unknown IPs/domains.

 

SOC Hunting Recommendations

  • Correlate DNS anomalies: Look for DNS queries to hard-coded resolvers followed by process creation events.
  • User behavior monitoring: Flag when users run commands copied from browsers or error pop-ups.
  • Python script detection: Hunt for Python processes performing reconnaissance or scanning.
  • Persistence checks: Regularly audit autostart entries for unauthorized additions.
  • ModeloRAT signatures: Deploy YARA/Sigma rules for known ModeloRAT artifacts.

 

 

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